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CASE NOTES

Constitutional Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PRUNING THE POISONOUS TREE: FLORIDA'S AGRICULTURAL INSPECTION STATUTE FALLS
TO A FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE-Lake Butler Apparel Co. v.
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 551 F. Supp.
901 (M.D. Fla. 1982)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1979, a series of vehicular detentions and searches made pursuant to Florida's agricultural inspection statute formed the factual matrix for litigation in Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Depart-

ment of Agriculture and Consumer Services.' While the incidents
in themselves were unremarkable, the United States District

Court's resolution of the issues in the case had a decidedly
profound impact on the statute, rendering it partially void for
want of compliance with the fourth amendment.' As a result of the
decision, the state's power to conduct non-consensual searches

under the statute has been, at least for the moment, severely
curtailed.
Although Lake Butler has substantial real-world significance to
the ongoing protection of the state's agricultural resources,3 at an1. 551 F. Supp. 901, (M.D. Fla. 1982).
2. In effect, the district court held the statute's warrant provision unconstitutional for
authorizing the issuance of search warrants without a showing of administrative probable
cause. Id. at 907. In the interim between the Lake Butler decision and the enactment of new
legislative standards, the road guards charged with conducting searches under the agricultural inspection statute were limited by the common law surrounding vehicular searches. In
the context of the agricultural inspection program, the opportunity to conduct a constitutionally valid search would generally arise in one of three situations: (1) where the driver of
the vehicle to be searched consented to the search, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); (2) where there existed probable cause to believe a search of the vehicle would yield
evidence of a statutory or regulatory violation, United States v. Ross, - U.S. - 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982); and (3) where the search was conducted incident to the lawful arrest of the
driver of the vehicle, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See also McDonough v. State,
8 FLA. L.W. 486 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 8, 1983) (search of vehicle based on probable cause and
not on warrant provision of agricultural inspection statute is valid and not contrary to Lake
Butler decision).
3. As early as 1930, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of the
citrus industry and the state's power to regulate it:
The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the
state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great
a portion of the population of the state is affected to such an extent by public
interest as to be within the police power of the sovereign.
Johnson v. State, 128 So. 853, 857 (Fla. 1930) (citations omitted).

452

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:451

other level it offers an opportunity to explore relatively uncharted
areas of fourth amendment jurisprudence. The agricultural inspection law, embodied in section 570.15, Florida Statutes, stood as
perhaps the only example of a statute authorizing the issuance of
administrative search warrants for the purpose of inspecting vehicles. The Lake Butler court was necessarily confronted with
unique constitutional questions. This note, after describing the legislative and judicial history of section 570.15, will examine the
court's rationale as it sought answers to those questions.
II.

BACKGROUND

Since its inception in 1934, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services' vehicle inspection program has experienced steady growth in the scope of its operations.4 The primary
purpose of the program is to enforce those rules which the Department has promulgated to regulate the movement of agricultural
products in the state.' The road guards who man the stations do
not engage in the actual inspection of produce, but instead are
given the task of checking the authenticity and order of documents
that accompany shipments, inspecting cargo to ensure that it conforms with those documents, and collecting statistical data.'
The first interception of marijuana from South Florida in 1973
injected a new and dangerous element into the agricultural inspection routine.7 Nevertheless, the possibility of encountering smug4. State of Florida, Executive Office of the Governor, Office of Planning and Budgeting,
Program Evaluation Office, Road Guard Agricultural Inspection Station/Contraband Study
(March 1980), at 7 [hereinafter cited as Road Guard Study]. The program traces its modest
origins to six inspection stations located on major highways crossing the Suwanee and St.
Mary's rivers in northern Florida. Initially, physical support for the inspectors was rather
austere: the inspection stations consisted of tents, and light was supplied by kerosene lanterns and flashlights. The inspectors were specifically limited to inspecting citrus products
and stations remained open only part of the year. By 1980 the number of stations had expanded to 19, no less than 14 types of agricultural commodities were subject to inspection
and the program operated year-round. From a few thousand bushels of citrus inspected in
1934, almost 57 million bushels were inspected in 1977-78. Id. at 7, 9.
5. FLA. STAT. § 570.44(3)(1981) establishes a "Bureau of Road Guards" and defines its
purpose:
It shall be the duty of this bureau to operate and manage those road guard inspection stations of the state and to perform the general inspection activities relating
to the movement of agricultural, horticultural, and livestock products and commodities as directed by the department and the division director.
6. Road Guard Study, supra note 4, at 11.
7. Id. at iii. At least five dangerous confrontations occurred between road guards and
marijuana smugglers during the years 1977-80. One such incident resulted in the kidnapping
and murder of road guard Austin Gay. Among the other episodes of violence, two road

1983]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

glers, while regrettable as an incidental danger to the road guards,
could not overshadow the emerging benefits of the situation. A
program which had previously been an innocuous tool for furthering administrative rules was rapidly evolving into a significant
weapon in Florida's fight against the importation of illegal drugs. 8
Changes in the agricultural inspection statute reflected an unstated legislative desire to maximize those benefits. Prior to 1975,
section 570.15 required the road guards to obtain a search warrant
before conducting any non-consensual searches of vehicles.' The
statute authorized "officers of the department" to have "full access
at all reasonable hours to all . . . motor vehicles . . .used in the
. . .transportation within the state of any agricultural product or

of any article or product" the Department had authority to regulate.10 If a driver refused access to a vehicle, the road guard could
apply for a search warrant subject to the same standards "as provided by law for the obtaining of search warrants in other cases."'
Thus, the road guards were held to the traditional requirement for
obtaining a warrant: a showing of probable cause to believe the
search would reveal evidence of a statutory violation."i
guards were abducted, one was shot at, and one was overpowered and disarmed. Id. at 1, 17.
The increased likelihood of encountering drug traffickers was directly attributable to
events occuring both in the United States and abroad. By 1979, over 42 million Americans
had sampled marijuana. The demand for the drug had quadrupled since 1974 to a daily
national consumption rate of about 130,000 pounds. By the mid-1970s, crackdowns on drug
smugglers and marijuana eradication programs carried out through the spraying of the herbicide paraquat had drastically reduced the amount of cannabis coming from Mexico. Colombian growers swiftly supplanted their Mexican counterparts as the major suppliers of
marijuana to the United States. Because of its location and features, Florida seemed the
logical point of entry for the contraband. From there, the drug was carried north by plane,
boat or motor vehicle. The Colombian Connection, TiME MAG. Jan. 29, 1979 at 22, 23.
8. Between 1973 and 1980 the road guards intercepted more than 175 vehicles carrying
marijuana. "Law enforcement officials in the Third Judicial Circuit in North Florida state
that there are probably more cases of marijuana arrests involving more than 100 pounds
made in this area than in any other area of the State." Road Guard Study, supra note 4 at
iv.
Statistics compiled through the inspection program support that assertion. Shipments of
marijuana seized by the inspectors average approximately one thousand pounds each. A single interception of marijuana made during the inspection of a semi-trailer resulted in the
confiscation of over 32 thousand pounds of the illegal drug. Id. at 15.
Consider the stakes involved: In 1979, a ton of marijuana had a street value of approximately $800 thousand dollars. A 16-ton load would be worth almost $13 million dollars. Id.
9. See FLA. STAT. § 570.15 (1961) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1) (1981)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The modern definition of probable cause can be traced to Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S.
642 (1878):
A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
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In 1975, however, an amendment to section 570.15 significantly
increased the investigative powers of the road guards by eliminating the warrant requirement under certain circumstances.I s At the
same time, the amendment narrowed the class of vehicles subject
to inspection to "trucks, motor vehicles other than private passenger automobiles with no trailer in tow. . . [and] truck and motor
vehicle trailers.14 Under the amended statute the road guards were
afforded the option of either obtaining a search warrant to perform
a non-consensual search or conducting the search "without a warrant pursuant to § 933.19."'5 Section 933.19 explicitly adopts the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Carroll v. United
States'" as the "statute law of the state applicable to searches and
seizures . . . [of] contraband.' 7 In Carroll, the Court held that
"[in cases where seizure is impossible except without a warrant,"
the seizing officer can perform a warrantless search if there exists
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the party is
guilty of the offence with which he is charged. . . . Such a state of facts as would
lead a man of ordinary caution to believe, or to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion, that the person is guilty.
Id. at 645 (citations omitted).
13. See Ch. 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)
(1981)).
14. Id. The 1975 amendment to § 570.15 provided for the inspection of recreational vehicles as well. However, in 1978, § 570.15 was once again amended to exempt additional classes of vehicles from inspection. RV's were covered by the exemption as were "travel trailers,
camping trailers, and motor homes." Ch. 78-180, § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 580, 581 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1) (1981)), amended by Ch. 79-587, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 13.
The new exemptions did not go unnoticed by the drug traffickers. According to the State
of Florida's Program Evaluation Office:
[T]he smugglers are using vehicles they know to not be subject to agricultural
inspection. Many authorities feel the smugglers are using motor homes and other
recreational vehicles to transport their illegal cargo. Motor homes can carry more
tons of marijuana than pickup trucks, vans or vehicular trailers, and are not subject to agricultrual inspection.
Road Guard Study, supra note 4, at 16.
Another major change embodied in the 1975 amendment was the inclusion of a provision
which made it a second degree misdemeanor "for any truck or any truck or motor vehicle
trailer to pass any official road guard inspection station without first stopping for inspection." Ch. 75-215, § 1(2), 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(2)
(1981)). The scope of the provision was broadened in 1979 to include all vehicles except cars
and RVs "which are used or are of a type which could be used" to transport agricultural
products. Ch. 79-587, § (1)(a), 1980 Fla. Laws 14 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
570.15(1)(a) (1981)). Interestingly, the 1979 amendment also made it a second degree misdemeanor to refuse to submit the vehicle for inspection. Id. at § 2.
15. Ch. 75-215, § 1(1), 1975 Fla. Laws 493, (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)
(1981)).
16. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

17.

FLA. STAT.

§ 933.19 (1975).
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"probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops
and seizes has contraband . . .therein."1 Thus, the strictures of

the Carroll rule allowed road guards to conduct warrantless
searches only in situations where there was both probable cause to
search and the procurement of a search warrant would be
impracticable.
An increase in arrests under the new statutory provisions
sparked a host of litigation in the courts. Challenges to the facial
constitutionality of section 570.15 did not fare well. In Stephenson
v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, " the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
finding it to be a valid exercise of the state's police powers which
did not impair the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal
protection, or freedom from unreasonable search and seizure."' Yet
the Florida Supreme Court's wholesale endorsement of the statute
did not prevent lower courts from overturning convictions based
on the validity of individual searches. In one year alone, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed no less than six convictions
based on evidence discovered through the inspection program."1
It was the court's decision in one of those cases, Pederson v.
State," that prompted the legislature to once again overhaul section 570.15.28 In Pederson, a road guard conducted a vehicular
18. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
19. 342 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1976).
20. Id. at 62. In adjudicating the issues, the supreme court simply adopted the opinion
of the First District Court of Appeal. It is difficult to ascertain the specific arguments raised
by the plaintiffs at the lower court levels. However, a review of other cases suggests the
probable content of those arguments.
In Gluesenkamp v. State, 391 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1980), the supreme court rejected the appellants' argument that the vehicle classification scheme in § 570.15 discriminates against
certain types of vehicles and their occupants in violation of the equal protection clause. Id.
at 200. In addition, the appellants argued that the classifications made by the statute were
unconstitutionally vague, thus denying them due process of law. Again, the court found
their arguments unpersuasive, holding that the "statutory definitions of 'truck' in chapters
316, 320, and 323, Florida Statutes (1977), provide authoritative definitions and indicate
what is the generally accepted definition of the word 'truck'." Id. at 198. See also Martin v.
State, 411 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1982) (court rejects equal protection and vagueness arguments).
21. See State v. Webb, 378 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Nelson v. State, 376 So. 2d
459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Villari v.
State, 372 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. lst DCA
1979); Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
22. 373 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
23. For an extensive analysis of the Pederson decision and its impact on § 570.15 see
Note, Highway AgriculturalInspections and Fla. Stat. § 570.15: An Attempt to Evade the
Reasonableness and Probable Cause Standards of the Fourth Amendment, 8 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 523 (1980).
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search pursuant to a warrant which had been improperly issued on
less than probable cause." ' The state argued that the less stringent
administrative probable cause standard established by the United
States Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court25 was applicable for obtaining a warrant under the agricultural inspection
statute.$G The district court refused to accept the state's argument,
finding that "the probable cause standard intended by Section
570.15(1)(b) is one of traditional probable cause.' 7 The court
noted, however, that "it may be constitutionally permissible for
the Legislature to impose an administrative probable cause standard" for obtaining a warrant, but declined to do so through the
judiciary.' 8
Less than five months after the Pederson decision, a radically
altered section 570.15 was passed by the legislature and signed into
law by Governor Bob Graham in December, 1979.1" The statute
contained a unique scheme for accomodating the special demands
of the administrative agricultural searches. Subject to inspection
under the statute were vehicles other than passenger cars and recreational vehicles which were used or could be used to transport
agricultural products.'0 In addition, if a road guard was denied permission to inspect a vehicle, a warrant would be issued upon a
showing of three factors: (1) that the road guard had reason to believe the vehicle was of the type subject to inspection under the
statute, (2) that the driver was given notice to stop for inspection,
and (3) that the driver refused to consent to the search."1 It was
this version of section 570.15 that was to be first challenged-and
challenged successfully-in Lake Butler.
24.

Pederson, 373 So. 2d at 369.

25.

387 U.S. 523 (1967).

26.

Pederson, 373 So. 2d at 369.

27.

Id.

28. Id. In addition to the court's comment in Pederson, on at least two prior occasions in
1979 the court had similarly prompted the legislature to amend § 570.15. See Rose v. State,
389 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (quoting Miller); Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943, 944
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (the "subject is one that is ripe for legislative consideration.").
29. Ch. 79-587, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 14, 15 (current version at
(1981)).

FLA. STAT.

§ 570.15(1)

30. Ch. 79-587, § (1)(a), 1980 Fla. Laws 14 (current version at
(1981)).

FLA. STAT.

§ 570.15(1)(a)

31. Ch. 79-587, § (1)(b), 1980 Fla. Laws 14 (current version at
(1981)).

FLA. STAT.

§ 570.15(1)(b)
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III. THE Lake Butler DECISION
In Lake Butler, the plaintiffs were corporations and individuals
involved in the transportation of textiles between factories in
Georgia and Florida.32 On four separate occasions the plaintiffs'
trucks were searched at agricultural inspection stations pursuant
to section 570.15.33 Additionally, in one instance a truck was

stopped and detained for two and one-half hours before being released, but no warrant was obtained and no search was conducted." The plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages, claiming their fourth
amendment rights were violated by the inspection process. 3 5 The
claims for damages were settled prior to final adjudication and
thus the district court was left to address the remaining questions
surrounding the constitutionality of section 570.15. 86
The court prefaced its analysis with a finding that most vehicles
passing through the inspection stations were neither detained nor
searched, and those that were targeted for inspection were done so
at the "unguided discretion of the Road Guards. .

. .""

Choosing

the Constitution as the proper starting point for its inquiry, the
court began by citing the simple language of the fourth amendment.38 A literal reading of the fourth amendment reveals that it
contains two edicts: the citizenry will be protected from unreasonable search and seizure, and a warrant to search will only be issued
upon a showing of probable cause.39 Thus, whenever a search or
seizure occurs it must meet the constitutional requirement of reasonableness.4 0 But when a search is made pursuant to a warrant it
must be both reasonable and based on probable cause."' This dis32.

Lake Butler, 551 F. Supp. at 903 (M.D. Fla. 1982).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 904.

37.
38.

Id.
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539 ("reasonableness is still the ultimate standard.").
Although there are several theories surrounding the interrelationship between the

warrant clause and the reasonableness clause, this interpretation "comes closest to describ-
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tinction is significant to the Lake Butler opinion. The district
court's analysis regarded the inspection process as a combination
of two distinct constitutional events: the stop or detention of the
vehicle and the subsequent search. The stops were made without
warrants; the searches were conducted pursuant to warrants as required by section 570.15. In evaluating the constitutionality of the
agricultural inspections, the court necessarily followed two separate lines of inquiry.
The stops were analyzed in the framework of Supreme Court
cases dealing with the warrantless detention of vehicles.4 In determining the validity of the searches made under section 570.15, the
Lake Butler court looked to the body of case law concerned with
administrative search warrants for guidance." Accordingly, this
note will afford those areas of the law separate examination.
A.

Stops and Detentions Under Section 570.15

By recognizing that the stop and detention of vehicles under section 570.15 implicated constitutional guarantees, the Lake Butler
court simply underscored an established concept of fourth amendment jurisprudence. As early as 1925, the Supreme Court in Carroll acknowledged the right to "free passage without interruption"
in a vehicle." In Delaware v. Prouse,4 the Court noted that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a
'seizure' within the meaning of [the fourth amendment], even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting deten' 46
tion quite brief."
In Lake Butler, the district court addressed the constitutionality
of stops and detentions made under section 570.15 in one sentence.'7 Citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte," the court siming the Court's present theory of the fourth amendment." Comment, Consideringthe TwoTier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U.L. Rzv. 85, 92 n. 34 (1981). Other interpre-

tations include: (1) the warrant clause and the reasonableness clause are to be read together,
making any warrantless search unreasonable; (2) the reasonableness clause is included to
ensure the searches conducted pursuant to a warrant meet an additional requirement of
reasonableness; (3) the warrant clause is controlling, and any intrusion performed under

warrant is per se reasonable. Id. at 91-92.
42. Lake Butler, 551 F. Supp. at 905.
43. Id. at 905-07.
44. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154.
45. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

46. Id. at 653.
47.
48.

Lake Butler, 551 F. Supp. at 905.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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ply concluded that "in the case of fixed checkpoints maintained by
law enforcement officers . . . vehicles may be stopped for a brief

period of time without probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion. '4'9 The court's statement seems to be an accurate recitation of
the Martinez-Fuerte rule. 0
In fact, a more extensive analysis indicates that the stops made
pursuant to section 570.15 are perhaps more reasonable than those
at issue in Martinez-Fuerte.In that case, the Court was faced with
determining the constitutionality of checkpoint stops of vehicles
made in the absence of any individualized suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle had committed a crime."' A fixed checkpoint
was established along a major highway in California in an effort to
intercept illegal aliens. 2 All vehicles were required to slow to a virtual halt for a cursory visual examination by law enforcement officers. 8 If a vehicle or its occupants seemed deserving of a more
thorough examination, the vehicle was directed to a secondary inspection area.54 There, the occupants were questioned about their
residency status for three to five minutes.5
The Martinez-Fuerte Court employed a balancing analysis in
evaluating the stops and detentions. Reasonableness was determined by weighing "the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual.""6 The public interest served by
the checkpoint screening for illegal aliens was found to be substantial2 Factors given weight in determining the intrusiveness of the
49. 551 F. Supp. at 905. Although the district court in Lake Butler found that "brief"
stops are constitutionally permissibile under the agricultural inspection program, challenges
to individual instances of excessive detention should receive close judicial scrutiny. Certainly the two and one-half hour detention of one plaintiff in Lake Butler would remove it
from the realm of the "reasonable" three to five minute detentions in Martinez-Fuerte.428
U.S. at 547.
The excessive detention in Lake Butler is not unprecedented in the history of the inspection program. In Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the plaintiff, after
refusing to consent to a search of his vehicle, was detained for over an hour while a road
guard repeatedly requested that he open the camper top to his pickup truck. The court
found that under the circumstances, the plaintiff's eventual consent to the search was not
freely and voluntarily given. Id. at 1204.
50. See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 562.
51. Id. at 547.
52. Id. at 545-46.
53. Id. at 546.

54.

Id.

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 546-47.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
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search included the type of traffic-checking operation," the potential for interference with legitimate traffic, 59 the amount of discretion used by the inspectors, 60 and the amount of suspicion required
to detain a vehicle. 1
The Court found that permanent checkpoint stops are less intrusive than those made by roving patrols because "the motorist can
see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of
the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
or annoyed." 2 "[I]nterference with legitimate traffic is minimal
[because] [m]otorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere." ' Since "It]he location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field
. . .checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity" because the inspection officers
are limited to checking only those cars which pass the checkpoint." The intrusion in the stopping of vehicles, and even in detaining them in the secondary inspection area, was "sufficiently
minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it." '"
An application of the Martinez-Fuerte Court's analysis to stops
and detentions made pursuant to section 570.15 logically yields a
finding of reasonableness. State interests served by the agricultural
inspection stations are substantial." Like the detentions in Martinez-Fuerte, the Lake Butler stops were made at permanent inspection stations. The agricultural inspections interfere with legitimate traffic even less than the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint
investigations because section 570.15 exempts passenger cars and
RV vehicles from its provisions. 6 ' Although the Lake Butler court
found detentions were made at the "unguided discretion of the
Road Guards, ' 68 the Supreme Court's rationale would suggest that
because the road guards were limited to checking only those vehicles which passed the stations-and then to only certain legisla58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560-62.
Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)).
Martinez-Fuerte428 U.S. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 563.
See supra note 3.
See FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(1982). Supra note 14.
Lake Butler, 551 F. Supp. at 904.
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tively-defined classes of vehicles-the stops made pursuant to section 570.15 were actually less discretionary than those in
Martinez-Fuerte.The absence of a probable cause requirement for
stopping vehicles under section 570.15 simply mirrored the facts of
Martinez-Fuerte.In the aggregate, the intrusions imposed by stops
and detentions under section 570.15 clearly seem to be outweighed
by the public interest in the continued security of Florida's agricultural market.
B. Searches Under Section 570.15
In evaluating the searches made pursuant to section 570.15, the
Lake Butler court primarily relied on the Supreme Court cases of
Camara v. Municipal Court,"9 and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.70 to
render its decision.
Camara exists as the vehicle through which the Supreme Court
first introduced current concepts of administrative search law. Refusing to uphold the constitutionality of warrantless housing inspections, the Court found that the fourth amendment mandate of
reasonableness requires that regulatory health inspections of private dwellings be conducted pursuant to a warrant.7 1 However, the
Court noted that "[w]here considerations of health and safety are
involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable
cause' to make an inspection are clearly different than those that
would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has
been undertaken."' In the context of building inspections, probable cause need not be based on "specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling" but instead on "reasonable legislative or administrative standards" which would indicate the
dwelling has a heightened potential for code violations. 73 Thus,
under Camara, unless the search to be conducteol falls under a recognized exception to the warrant rule, 4 regulatory inspections
69. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
70. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
71. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. In the companion case to Camara,See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that private commercial buildings also deserve the protection afforded by an administrative search warrant. Id. at 545.
72. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
73. Id.
74. In Camara,the Court cautioned that "nothing we say today is intended to foreclose
prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations." Id. at 539. Section 570.15 is not a quarantine statute and so does not fall

under the "emergency inspection" exception. See State v. Bailey, 586 P.2d 648 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978) (warrantless search of vehicle made pursuant to Arizona quarantine law upheld
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must be conducted pursuant to a warrant and the warrant must be
based at a minimum on administrative probable cause. Clearly, the
searches in Lake Butler met the first requirement. In order to evaluate the second requirement, the district court reviewed an elaboration of the Camara
standards in the more recent case of Mar5
shall v. Barlow's.7

The Lake Butler court's frequent references to Marshall v. Barlow's suggest its importance in the analysis of section 570.15. In
Marshall v. Barlow's, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
the warrantless safety inspections of businesses conducted pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act."6 The Court rejected the arguments that the effectiveness of the Act would be
unduly burdened by the warrant requirement" and that "the incremental protections afforded the employer's privacy by a warrant
are so marginal that they fail to justify the administrative burdens
that may be entailed.

7

8

As for the administrative burden in secur-

ing a warrant, the Court noted that "[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required."'7 9 At the same time, a warrant

"would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute,
and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria." 80 Thus, reasonableness flows from the adherence of
the "neutral officer" to the warrant procedure and his resultant inability to exercise "unbridled discretion" in the field. 1
Applying the Court's rule to the agricultural inspection statute,
the district court in Lake Butler found that section 570.15 failed to
provide neutral criteria "for the guidance of Road Guards in the
selection of vehicles to be searched, or for the guidance of judicial
officers in issuing warrants for such searches" and was thus "insufas constitutional.)
Another exception to the warrant requirement exists in the context of regulatory inspections. In pervasively regulated industries with "a long tradition of close government supervision" no reasonable expectation of privacy exists "over the stock of such an enterprise" and
warrantless searches are reasonable. Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313. See United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms business exception to warrant requirement);
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor business exception to
warrant requirement.)
75. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 316.
78. Id. at 322.
79. Id. at 320.
80. Id. at 323.
81. Id.
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ficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement of 'probable
82
cause' as interpreted in Marshall v. Barlow's."
Yet, on its face, section 570.15 specifically lists the criteria that
must be present to procure a warrant,8" and in the absence of those
criteria (or presumably, a showing of traditional probable cause) a
warrant would not issue. On a very literal level, the road guards
did not enjoy unbridled discretion, but were generally limited to
conducting vehicular searches when they had either consent to
search or had obtained a warrant pursuant to the statute's warrant
provision. Additionally, it is difficult to say that the warrant provision itself was overbroad, for it in fact pertained to only a very
narrow class of vehicles: those subject to inspection under the statute which had been given notice to stop and to which the road
guards had been denied access.8 4 And therein lies the exquisite
logic of the warrant provision. By making the assertion of fourth
amendment rights one of the neutral criteria, the power to conduct
a non-consensual search was triggered only when consent to search
was withheld. Thus, the road guards were limited to searching in
only two situations: when they had consent to search and when
they did not. Obviously, these are limitations without meaning.
And, as the Lake Butler court noted, the "mere showing that [the
warrant requirements were] sufficient to satisfy the statute, is insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.""3
IV.

AFTERMATH

The Lake Butler decision was handed down in November,
1982." The Department of Agriculture was left with a limited
number of options: appeal the decision, re-write the warrant provision to include meaningful neutral criteria for establishing administrative probable cause, or neither appeal nor amend the statute
but instead search pursuant to the traditional probable cause standard. The Department chose the second option. In May, 1983, a
newly amended version of section 570.15 was approved by the
House Judiciary Committee.87 Included in the warrant provision is
a new requirement that any vehicle to be searched pursuant to an
administrative search warrant must be selected according to spe82.
83.

Lake Butler, 551 F. Supp. at 907.
See FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(1981).

84.

Id.

85. Lake Butler, 551 F. Supp. at 907.
86. Id. at 901.
87. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 384 (Reg. Sess. May 12, 1983)
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cific neutral criteria established by Department of Agriculture
rules."
V.

CONCLUSION

The unique warrant provision of Florida's agricultural inspection
law attempted to circumvent the purposes of the fourth amendment while facially adhering to the requirements of administrative
probable cause as set out in Marshall v. Barlow's. It is undisputed
that the warrant provision was enacted to serve important state
interests. Yet, at the same time, fourth amendment rights should
not be sacrificed in the name of administrative expedience. That
more reasonable alternatives were available, and should have been
employed, is evidenced by the state's decision to forego appeal and
formulate new inspection guidelines.
If history is any indication, the most recent version of section
570.15 will surely be challenged in the courts. If, as the Supreme
Court has said, "[tihe basic purpose of [the fourth amendment]
... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,"" then the new regulations, by providing realistic constraints on the discretion of the
road guards, should withstand the inevitable challenge.

PAUL

88.
89.

Fla. HB 310, 51(b)(2) (1983).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
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